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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
he Bayer-Monsanto deal is 
controversial in a number of ways, 
some linked to ecological concerns 
around Monsanto’s products. But the main 
opposition is well worn: that it would reduce 
competition in agricultural chemicals. While 
we are not in a position to judge whether anti-
trust rules have been violated, the rationale 
behind the merger is at least partly likely to 
be linked to not just cost savings and 
innovation sharing, but also to an attempt to 
change the profitability dynamics of the 
industry. 
It may seem obvious that increasing 
concentration will increase the profitability of 
a market, but it is not always the case. Look 
at the UK food retail sector. The market is 
already dominated by four players (the 
discounters still have less than 10% share) 
and yet some, like Tesco, are struggling to 
make a 5% margin. (The Asda/Sainsbury 
proposal is arguably a triumph of hope over 
experience). 
In this paper we tackle the following main 
questions: 
- Are more synergies generated by a deal 
the more the deal concentrates a 
market? 
- If you are doing such a deal (a deal 
within your own sector), are there certain 
qualities about the targets you should be 
looking at? 
- And are there aspects of your own firm 
that will influence the success or failure 
of these deals? 
The approach we avoid 
We take a holistic approach to the concept of 
synergy. We are not looking at documented 
cost savings, margin gains or cross selling 
opportunities. In particular we are not looking 
at the gains companies claim pre-deal in what 
is usually an accompanying PowerPoint PR 
slide pack. We are also not considering the 
synergies reported after the deal takes place. 
We believe there are two fundamental 
problems with taking such an approach. The 
first is that it is almost impossible to capture 
the benefits and costs in a merger by direct 
up-front financial analysis given the almost 
limitless list of impacts including, but not 
restricted to: cost savings, integration costs, 
enforced disposals, technology sharings, 
best practice exchange, fundamental 
changes in market structure, loss of key 
personnel, etc. Secondly, the synergies 
claimed by acquiring companies after the 
event are somewhat suspiciously almost 
always greater than those targeted and are 
impossible to verify externally given that the 
business units involved have merged, often 
the whole rationale for the deal.  
We take a ‘market’ approach 
So instead we take what might be called an 
independent ‘market’ approach and judge 
total synergy creation by the value the market 
ascribes is being added by the deal. We 
consider intra-sector deals only and our 
findings are as follows: 
- The more the deal concentrates a 
market, the greater the synergies 
- Low leverage of the target leads to 
higher value creation 
- Low profitability of the acquirer leads to 
greater value creation 
The findings of the paper support our initial 
expectations in that when firms gain higher 
market power, i.e., a merger upwardly 
changes market concentration, the merger 
results in more synergistic gains to the 
merging firms. However, it is necessary for 
the level of market concentration to be below 
a certain threshold before the deal; otherwise 
there is likely to be little potential for 
incremental operational gains and there is a 
risk of anti-trust intervention. 
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What we knew about synergies and M&A
he ultimate goal of many if not most 
mergers and acquisitions is the creation 
of synergies that can lead to improved 
efficiency, strengthened market presence, 
greater growth opportunities and increased 
profitability. 
On the one hand, there are numerous papers 
proving the existence of synergies. 1  On the 
other hand, just as numerous are the studies 
suggesting that mergers do not lead to the 
successful creation of synergies but rather the 
opposite. 2  A possible explanation for this 
discrepancy may be the wide range of motives 
for entering the transaction as well as the post-
event characteristics of the merging firms’ 
market.  
Generally, regardless of the industry, a merger 
between two companies, within that industry, 
will result in a lessening of competition, and 
hence will tend to be better received by the 
market. 
Factors affecting M&A 
The motives behind mergers are not the only 
matter to impact M&A transactions. There are 
other factors in the financial literature that have 
been proven to affect M&A in regard to value 
creation. To distinguish them further, there are 
considerations not related to the primary 
reasoning behind the merger, which however 
still affect the outcome of the transaction. One 
paper 3  summarises 89 empirical studies 
published between 1984 and 2009 and 
concludes that the most frequent factor is 
relatedness of the acquiring firm (58% of 
studies), followed by the relative size of the 
target to the bidder company (52% of studies), 
previous M&A experience of bidder (28% of 
studies) and the method of payment (18% of 
                                                          
1 As an example, see Craninckx, K. and Hyghebaert, M., 
European Management Journal, 2015 
2 As an example, see Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F.P. and 
Stulz, R.M. Journal of Finance, 2005 
3 As an example, see Hitt, M., King, D., Krishnan, H. and Makri, 
M., Business Horizons, 2009 
4 Singh, H. and Montgomery, C., Strategic Management Journal, 
1987 
studies). Some of these factors, and additional 
ones which are not listed above, are considered 
in our work.  
Nevertheless, there are no corroborative 
conclusions on how exactly relatedness 
impacts profitability. However, another paper4, 
found that related mergers result in higher 
abnormal returns when compared against 
unrelated ones while other studies5 claim that 
due to cultural differences, a domestic merger 
has much higher chance of being successful 
than an international one. 
As an aside, on a very basic level mergers and 
acquisitions can be of such size as to affect the 
whole acquiring company’s risk profile. This is 
mainly due to their intrinsic nature, as in 
addition to improving efficiency, mergers often 
lead to better diversification, i.e. healthier risk 
appearance. A positive result of this reduced 
business risk is that many companies appear to 
improve their financial leverage post-merger as 
well as experience greater tax benefits from 
using more debt. 
It is important to note that there is a gap in the 
extant M&A literature since not many papers 
have examined the effect of changes in industry 
concentration on deal synergies. The papers 
studying market concentration in mergers 
mainly examine the relationship between 
merging firms and their rivals, and whether the 
merger results in anticompetitive behaviour. 6 
Generally, results show a positive synergy 
creation. This is most evidenced in the banking 
sector. Studies have documented that since 
1990, mergers between banks in highly 
concentrated markets lead to higher deposit 
rates, and hence, higher profitability to the 
merging banks.7 
5 As an example, see Piekkari, R., Vaara, E., Tienari, J. and 
Sdntti, R., The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 2005 
6 As an example, see Shahrur, H., Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2005 
7 As an example, see Hankir, Y., Rauch, C. and Umber, M., 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011 
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Market Power 
In many instances, firms strive to increase their 
presence in the market since doing so will allow 
them to have a bigger impact on the pricing of 
products. This can be exceptionally harmful to 
consumers, and it is the reason why 
governments may intervene if a proposed 
merger would result in monopolistic power in 
the market. Intra-industry mergers between two 
large relative companies result in a substantial 
lessening of competition.8 It is often argued that 
the weakened regulatory oversight through the 
late 1990s increased incentives for companies 
to acquire competitors with the intention of 
extending their power over price, quality and 
nature of the product. This rise in market power 
can be seen as a transfer from consumers to 
the company and, thus, a value stream which is 
interconnected with the deal premium. On the 
contrary, three potential sources of merger 
gains, specifically, tax savings, productive 
efficiencies and increased market power, 
actually indicate that neither tax savings nor 
higher market power lead to as many gains as 
the better deployment of available resources.9 
The main question 
In this study, the focus is on intra-sector 
mergers. Since these mergers occur between 
two companies in the same industry, they have 
the potential to change the market 
concentration and competitiveness within that 
industry. Moreover, acquisitions which occur 
within an already concentrated industry may 
lead to a substantial holding of market power 
and in extreme cases, a monopoly one. In some 
occasions, mergers within highly concentrated 
industries, may effortlessly enable collusion. It 
could then be argued that if such a collusion 
probability exists, competitors of the combining 
companies are also expected to earn positive 
abnormal returns around the M&A 
announcement.  
This is how the Market Power Hypothesis was 
born. It is centred on anticompetitive effects 
                                                          
8 Hankir, Y., Rauch, C. and Umber, M., Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 2011 
9 Devos, E., Kadapakkam, P. and Krishnamurthy, S., The Society 
for Financial Studies, 2008 
arising from mergers and acquisitions. For this 
reason, antitrust authorities usually inspect 
whether a merger may lead to such an 
outcome. This is evident in the banking sector, 
for example, as it may lead to more limited 
lending: in one study in the early 1990’s, 
substantial mergers led to a change in deposit 
rates because of greater market power, 
whereas smaller mergers, with a lower impact 
on concentration, did not affect deposit rates at 
all. 10  This suggests a link between realised 
effects and post-event market concentration. 
As such, the study posits that the synergistic 
gains generated by mergers are affected by 
post-event market concentration because if 
they lead to reduced competition, the market 
will notice this and react. The main reason for 
this is that the greater market concentration 
may lead to strengthened market power of not 
only acquirers but rivals as well, possibly 
resulting in higher prices and hence, higher 
revenues. 
Our angle 
As mentioned at the opening of this report, 
there is no definite method of measuring 
synergistic gains. So, to test for our hypothesis, 
we use the method suggested by Ellert 
(1976 11 ), stating that the existence of any 
positive abnormal returns around a merger will 
confirm the existence of synergies. This will in 
turn show whether the created synergies are 
affected by market concentration. A positive 
relationship between created synergies and 
market concentration is expected, since 
investors, who believe that higher market power 
leads to higher profitability, will revalue the 
merged company.  
Previous literature also, unsurprisingly, attests 
that if the two combining companies are related, 
they are much more likely to achieve synergistic 
gains than if they were unrelated. This is taken 
into account by only including mergers where 
the acquirer and the target share the same first 
3-digit primary SIC code, i.e., horizontal 
10 Prager, R. and Hannan, T., Journal of Industrial Economics, 
1998 
11 Ellert, J., The Journal of Finance, 1976 
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mergers. One paper argues that horizontal 
mergers have a higher chance of achieving 
successful synergies as they allow for the 
realisation of economies of scale and scope as 
well as gains from market power. 12 
Furthermore, of course, horizontal mergers are 
the only ones that we could meaningfully test 
for market concentration effects. 
Hence, the focus of this study is to determine 
whether returns related to merger events intra-
sector are affected by potential changes in 
market concentration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
12 Seth, A., Strategic Management Journal, 1990 
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Our approach and our questions 
ur deal sample is based on the U.S. 
market, with transactions taking place 
between 1 January 2004 and 31 
December 2014, This yields 10,757 mergers 
and acquisitions. We then impose certain 
criteria necessary for this study (detailed in the 
Appendix).  
Considering these aforementioned restrictions 
and the additional restriction that the buyer and 
selling companies have the first 3 digits of their 
SIC code in common, the sample is reduced to 
589 mergers. However, after obtaining stock 
prices of both bidders and targets, the sample 
is additionally restricted in that all acquirers and 
targets should have share prices data available 
for at least 240 days before and 80 days after 
the M&A announcement date. The purpose of 
the restriction is to perform the Event Study. 
Ultimately, this gives a sample of 461 mergers 
meeting all requirements.  
The event study 
In brief, to do this, the abnormal returns to the 
target, acquirer, and the merged company, are 
calculated during each merger event, and 
further assessed whether they are significantly 
influenced by the change in the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index stemming from the merger.  
To study the effect of the merger 
announcement on both parties of the merger, 
the research utilises the event study 
methodology. Event studies are used because 
there is a general acceptance in the financial 
literature that they are able to capture the 
effects of merger announcements on targets 
and bidders.13 Event studies employ the use of 
firms’ share prices, which according to the 
value theory facilitate the correct determination 
of companies’ financial performance since 
embedded in the share price is the present 
value of expected future returns. This means 
that whenever there is a change of expectations 
about the future performance of the firm, the 
stock price will immediately react. In this 
                                                          
13 Fama, E. and Jensen, M., The Journal of Law and Economics, 
1983) 
manner, it is important to note that the event 
study methodology assumes the market is 
semi-strong efficient and will react to any new 
information as soon as it is available.   
Our event study methodology 
We measure the market reaction to the 
announcement of a deal over a given period. 
For those believers in efficient markets this is 
taken as a marker as to the value creation (or 
not) of the deal. While this data is often cited 
and is the most widely used to judge deal 
success, there are issues with that viewpoint 
such as its interaction with risk arbitrage 
strategies. In the final study, we therefore use a 
window that runs from two days prior to 
announcement to two days after. This is to 
catch any pre-announcement run up and to 
allow the market to digest the financial 
implications of a deal. The abnormal returns are 
calculated versus those of the average stock in 
the study. (We also considered using the 
market as the benchmark, but robustness 
checks indicated that the outcomes were 
qualitatively consistent). This event window is 
the most commonly used in the literature but 
note that we show our early analysis across a 
range of windows. 
In our particular study we need to analyse the 
share price movements in the context of 
synergy creation and market concentration. 
Synergy measure 
In order to create a measure for synergies as 
the dependent variable, the study follows the 
model developed by Bradley et al. and 
constructs a value-weighted portfolio of the 
acquirer and target, weighting their respective 
market capitalisations 20 trading days before 
the announcement.14 It employs the constant-
mean-adjusted model to calculate the expected 
normal returns. Then, as suggested by Lang et 
al., once the portfolio has been created, its 
cumulative abnormal returns over the various 
14 Bradley, M., Desai, A. and Kim, E., Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1988 
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event windows can be seen as a valid measure 
of the created synergies.15 The formula for the 
returns is given as Figure 7 in the Appendix. 
This will be used to test the market power 
hypothesis, which posits that there is a positive 
relationship between abnormal returns of the 
merging firms and both the concentration of the 
industry in which the merger takes place and 
the merger-provoked change in concentration.  
Market concentration measure 
The paper employs the method used by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) to monitor for 
market concentration, through the use of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The index is 
calculated as the sum of the squared market 
shares (𝑀𝑆𝑖) of all (N) firms within the industry 
and is scaled from 0 to 10,000 points, where 
higher concentration is indicated by a higher 
number.  
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑀𝑆𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                         
The change in market concentration caused by 
a merger is calculated independently from the 
industry level HHI. It is simply the doubled 
product of the market shares of both acquirer 
(𝑀𝑆𝐴) and target (𝑀𝑆𝑇). 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 2 ∗ 𝑀𝑆𝐴 ∗ 𝑀𝑆𝑇                                           
The event study methodology is performed in a 
multivariate framework so we can consider 
other (in addition to market concentration) 
potential drivers of synergy size such as 
profitability and leverage. The variables 
considered and their averages in our study are 
shown below. 
Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics for accounting control variables 
                
Source: Cass Business School 
                                                          
15 Lang, L., Stulz, R. and Walkling, R., Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1989 
 Acquirer Target 
Accounting Ratio Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Return on Equity 5.84% 11.69% 1.409 4.39% 7.26% 1.560 
Debt/Equity 1.343 0.529 9.773 0.743 0.374 4.127 
Debt/Capital 0.388 0.361 0.317 0.407 0.311 1.624 
Equity/Total Assets 0.384 0.391 0.284 0.398 0.403 0.386 
Net Profit Margin 8.85% 10.97% 0.298 -68.92% 6.33% 12.318 
Cash Flow/Sales 0.222 0.232 0.185 -0.528 0.153 11.314 
Cash/Current Assets 0.405 0.412 0.256 0.455 0.451 0.297 
Book-to-Market 0.615 0.517 0.760 0.679 0.550 0.858 
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Our findings 
irst, we consider the overall returns 
around the deals in our study. 
In accordance with the financial 
literature, the paper finds that targets earn 
statistically significant positive returns, in 
contrast to the acquirers’ negative such returns 
as shown in Figure 2.16  
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns to targets and 
bidders across event windows 
Event 
period Target Acquirer 
 
Abnormal 
return 
Abnormal 
return 
(-1, +1) 29.01% -0.13% 
Significance (Strong) (Very weak) 
(-2, +2) 29.24% -0.19% 
Significance (Strong) (Very weak) 
(-5, +5) 29.46% -0.21% 
Significance (Strong) (Very weak) 
(-10, +10) 29.12% -0.45% 
Significance (Strong) (Very weak) 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
Figure 3: Statistics of created synergies in combined entity 
Even though the average acquirer experiences 
negative returns, they are statistically 
insignificant. Thus, it cannot be concluded that 
the merger destroys value. To test this 
proposition, we examine whether synergies are 
actually created by looking at the combined 
reaction of acquirers’ and targets’ shares. 
Irrespective of the event window period 
selected, the results show significantly positive 
abnormal returns (see Figure 3 below). The 
values are consistent with previous literature 
studying the existence of value gains in intra-
sector mergers. More importantly, it can be said 
that the results agree with the synergy 
expectation in that the total gain to both parties 
is significantly positive.  
Therefore, it can be said that for the studied 
sample, mergers, on average, result in 
synergistic gains. Subsequently, this gives us 
the opportunity to examine the hypothesis that 
they are affected by the level of market 
concentration, in that the higher the change in 
market concentration induced by the merger, 
the higher the abnormal returns generated.  
 
 
 Event Window Observations 
Mean 
abnormal 
return 
Median 
abnormal 
return Significance 
(-1, +1) 461 3.01% 1.85% Strong 
(-2, +2) 461 2.95% 1.80% Strong 
(-5, +5) 461 2.94% 1.70% Strong 
(-10, +10) 461 2.50% 1.74% Strong 
 
Source: Cass Business School 
  
                                                          
16 In the regression analysis results that follows we ascribe the 
following descriptors to various significance levels: Strong (p 
value < 0.01), Moderate (p<0.05), Weak (p<0.1), Very weak (All 
other values). 
F 
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The first significant finding is that the higher the 
market concentration within the industry the 
higher the value of total synergies created 
(Figure 4). But as we will see even this ‘basic’ 
finding has its limits. 
Now we return to our three main questions: 
- Are more synergies generated by a deal 
the more the deal concentrates a market? 
- If you are doing such a deal (a deal within 
your own sector), are there certain 
qualities about the targets you should be 
looking at? 
- And are there aspects of your own firm that 
will influence the success or failure of 
these deals? 
These questions are tackled using a multi-
variable analysis, with results shown in Figure 
5. At this stage we proceed only with the (-2,2) 
event window with results to this point being 
largely independent of deal window and (-2,2) 
being the most common window seen in other 
studies. 
Results 
There are three significant results: 
- The more the deal concentrates a market, 
the greater the synergies 
- In intra-sector deals, low leverage of the 
target leads to greater value creation 
- In intra-sector deals, low profitability of the 
acquirer leads to greater value creation 
Note: the data for other control variables with an 
insignificant impact (as described in Figure 1) is 
not shown. 
The model shows that the most influential 
factors on the created synergies are in fact the 
change in market concentration, the change in 
market concentration relative to the industry, 
the target’s debt-to-equity ratio and the 
acquirer’s ROE.  
We can interpret the figures in percentage 
terms which helps give a better feel for the 
relative importance of these factors. So, a 1% 
increase in concentration post-merger will lead 
to a 4.6% increase in synergies. 
However, in contrast to previous models, the 
level of Herfindahl Index itself is no longer 
significant in explaining synergies. 
Nonetheless, the high significance of the 
change in market concentration and the change 
relative to the industry imply that it is indeed the 
change in post-event market concentration that 
drives the value of created synergies, as 
hypothesised. Furthermore, the High 
Concentration (HH index >1,800) result 
suggests that if a merger is within a highly 
concentrated market, the synergies created are 
expected to be 3.1% higher. The results agree 
with another study in that mergers between 
firms within highly concentrated industries 
generally lead to better efficiency, which the 
market prices into the shares.17  
The analysis also gives us two drivers of intra-
sector merger synergies. Lower leverage of a 
target leads to greater value creation through 
synergy, as does lower target profitability.  
There is one final conclusion, and that comes 
from the significant negative relationship 
between synergy and the term (Change in HHI 
* absolute level of HHI). This tells us that there 
is a limit. If industries are close to being a 
monopoly/duopoly then further increases in HHI 
start to see diminishing returns in terms of 
further synergy through mergers. 
  
                                                          
17 Peltzmann, S., The Journal of Law and Economics, 1977 
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Figure 4: Testing for effect of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on synergies 
 Interval (days) 
Variable (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-5, 5) (-10, 10) 
     
Herfindahl Index 0.0180 0.0187 0.018* 0.0142 
 (Strong) (Strong) (Moderate) (Weak) 
     
Observations 461 461 461 461 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
 
Figure 5: Multiple regression model: Testing for effect of influencing variables on synergies (-2,2 event window) 
  
Variable Synergy impact 
Herfindahl Index -0.00296 
 (Very weak) 
Change in Herfindahl Index 0.0460 
 (Strong) 
Change in HHI * Herfindahl Index -0.00559 
 (Strong) 
Deal Value -0.000152 
 (Very weak) 
Target’s Debt/Equity -0.00291 
 (Strong) 
Acquirer’s Return on Equity -0.00492 
 (Strong) 
High Concentration 0.0311 
 (Weak) 
Source: Cass Business School
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Conclusions and recommendations  
his report examined the effect of market 
concentration on value creation in 
mergers and acquisitions by studying a 
sample of 461 horizontal mergers in the U.S. 
between 2004 and 2014. In competitive 
markets, companies earn normal profits in the 
long-run. This usually means that if markets are 
more concentrated, firms have a higher 
potential to realise superior gains. Therefore, 
the investigation had an initial expectation that 
if mergers lead to higher concentration, they are 
likely to achieve higher gains when compared 
to those occurring in already more competitive 
markets.   
In order to assess if this is true, the study used 
the market value-weighted combined abnormal 
returns reaction of targets and bidders to M&A 
announcements as a proxy of additional value 
creation, i.e., synergies.  
Market power pays off 
The in-market mergers studied in this report 
showed positive synergy creation in that, on 
average, they resulted in a positive total gain to 
both bidders and targets. Furthermore, the 
study concluded that those mergers which 
result in higher merger-induced changes in 
market concentration lead to a higher value of 
created synergies. Moreover, the study found 
that additional value is created when the target 
firm has a lower leverage and the bidder has 
lower profitability, as measured by their debt-to-
equity and return on equity ratios respectively 
(in the year prior to the merger). 
We would argue that the latter of these findings 
in particular makes intuitive sense in that a less 
profitable acquirer has more to gain from an in-
market acquisition from pricing power and basic 
economies of scale, than an already optimised 
business. The leverage finding is perhaps less 
intuitively obvious but could be linked to the 
market’s dislike of the acquisition of already 
highly leveraged targets. 
Another finding of the paper was that many of 
the factors that have been proven to affect 
mergers and acquisitions in general had no 
impact on the studied intra-sector deal sample. 
The paper also showed that if the market is 
close to monopolistically dominated, mergers 
are expected to result in a lower value of 
synergistic gains. This may be explained by the 
antitrust laws imposed on mergers and 
acquisitions in the U.S. (and elsewhere), which 
require merging companies in less competitive 
industries to amend their initial deal 
arrangements if they are to result in higher 
market concentration. These amendments may 
cause different outcomes than originally 
planned, hence the lower value creation.   
Overall, the findings of this study are additive to 
previous papers in the field that the merger-
induced change in market concentration is 
looked at in terms of its impact on total value 
creation for the firms involved, whereas 
previous literature is mainly focused on whether 
mergers result in collusive and anticompetitive 
benefits as measured by the combined gains to 
the merging firms and their rivals. Therefore, 
this paper contributes to the existing literature 
by showing the positive impact of greater 
market concentration in various industries on 
the creation of additional value for the merging 
firms only.  
Some lessons 
For firms looking to make acquisitions the 
messages are fairly clear. First, the market is 
probably right in typically pushing you towards 
in-market deals rather than cross-border or 
cross-sector acquisitions, as long as your own 
market is yet to be near oligopoly status (in 
which case the regulators may have something 
to say anyway!). Second, markets may also 
welcome such deals as a way out of a 
profitability hole, as long as you are not taking 
on a deal with excessive leverage. 
 
 
T 
 13 
 
© Cass Business School May 2018 
 
Appendix
Deal sample 
Our deal sample is based on the U.S. market, which offers the most complete data due to the SEC’s 
consistent and detailed reporting requirements. To gather the merger data, the study uses the Thomson 
One Banker’s M&A Database for transactions between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2014, where 
both the target and the acquirer are U.S. public companies. This yields 10,757 mergers and acquisitions 
meeting these conditions. However, all deals also have to comply with the following criteria:  
- M&A deal information is disclosed 
- Transaction Value is disclosed 
- Transaction Value is greater than $100 million 
- Deal is not cross-border 
- Deal is not cross-industry  
- SIC codes of Acquirers and Targets are available 
- Deal is completed 
The below table summarises the satisfying 461 deals: 
Figure 6: Descriptive Statistics of deals according to major division of operations 
Division 
Number 
of Deals 
% of 
Total 
Total Deal 
Value ($Mil) 
Average Deal 
Value ($Mil) 
Median Deal 
Value ($Mil) 
Mining 28 6.07% $121,162 $4,327 $1,684 
Manufacturing 154 33.41% $284,001 $1,844 $709 
Transportation & Public Utilities 48 10.41% $245,944 $5,123 $1,611 
Wholesale Trade 5 1.08% $2,513 $502 $592 
Retail Trade 10 2.17% $9,535 $953 $733 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 140 30.37% $293,805 $2,098 $314 
Services 76 16.49% $106,322 $1,398 $540 
Total 461 100% $1,063,285.96 $16,249 $6,186 
Source: Cass Business School 
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Return formulation 
Figure 7: Weighted abnormal return formulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lang et al. (1989) 
 
  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐴,(−𝑡1,𝑡2)∗𝑀𝑉𝐴,𝑡=−20+ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇,(−𝑡1,𝑡2)∗𝑀𝑉𝑇,𝑡=−20
𝑀𝑉𝐴,𝑡=−20+𝑀𝑉𝑇,𝑡=−20
                        
CARA, (-t1, t2): Acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return for event window (-t1, t2); 
CART, (-t1, t2): Target’s cumulative abnormal return for event window (-t1, t2); 
MVA, t=-20: Acquirer’s market capitalisation 20 trading days prior the announcement; 
MVT, t=-20: Target’s market capitalisation 20 trading days prior the announcement. 
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